

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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
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## [Vietnam:

South Vietnam: There was widely scattered military action on 24-25 November.

Enemy troops fired at least 18 122-mm. rockets at allied air facilities near Da Nang, causing some material damage, and a Communist mortar barrage wounded 15 Americans at a base camp northeast of Pleiku. The enemy also conducted small mortar attacks against allied installations near Vinh Long and Can Tho in the delta. Some limited ground actions resulted from allied sweeps in the provinces around Saigon.

On 24 November, a Communist mortar position within the Demilitarized Zone fired six rounds at an allied position northeast of Gio Linh. This was the first such shelling from within or north of the zone since 12 November.

North Vietnam: Three manned US aircraft have been shot down south of the 19th parallel during the last three days. A reconnaissance aircraft and an armed escort aircraft were lost in separate incidents northwest of Dong Hoi, and another reconnaissance aircraft was downed northwest of Vinh. Pilots flying ground fire suppression missions during rescue operations report being attacked by surface-to-air missiles near Vinh and by intense antiaircraft fire from batteries northwest of Dong Hoi.


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Hanoi's chief foreign aid negotiator, Le Thanh Nghi, has left for Moscow and other Communist capitals to conduct another round of talks in the semiannual series of aid negotiations with North

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## Approved For Release 2003/10/07 P. CFA-RDP79T00975A012600080001-3

Vietnam's allies. According to a Hanoi radio-broadcast, he is scheduled to negotiate military and economic assistance for 1969. It seems likely, however, that the North Vietnamese expect to put new emphasis on economic aid in the talks, since they are interested in starting serious planning for postwar reconstruction and this will be heavily dependent on getting aid commitments for priority projects.

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Warsaw Pact - Rumania: A meeting of high-level Warsaw Pact staff officers, aimed at underscoring Rumania's obligations to the pact, opens today in Bucharest.

Bucharest radio said the meeting would consider "problems related to combat training." Warsaw Pact commander Yakubovsky, who is chairing the meeting, may have arrived in Bucharest late last week. Other high-ranking officers from the pact countries were noted arriving at Bucharest airport yesterday.

This meeting is another step toward forcing Rumania back into closer cooperation with the pact. It will probably be followed by a meeting of the pact's political consultative committee in December. Moscow is also pressing for a CEMA summit meeting, possibly to be held at the same time.

The military situation on Rumania's borders remains normal. The national exercise of Rumanian armed forces continues, and the pact staff officers now in Bucharest may observe these maneuvers. In their latest air trip along the Soviet side of the border on 22 November, US attachés saw no signs of unusual military activity.

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Egypt: Student unrest is highlighting the gradually growing malaise and general distrust of authority in Egypt.

Following student demonstrations in the Nile delta town of Mansoura last week in which several were killed and injured, sympathy demonstrations were mounted by students in Alexandria and Cairo. In an attempt to curb further trouble, the government on 23 November announced the closure of all universities and colleges. Extensive student rioting in Alexandria yesterday caused damage to stores and public transport vehicles. Authorities apparently used considerable force, resulting in a number of injuries.

Although the initial demonstrations reportedly were directed against new education laws aimed at raising standards in Egyptian secondary schools—and consequently, standards of admission to univer—sities—the problem evidently runs deeper. Student and intellectual discontent with the repressive nature of the Nasir regime and with the lack of meaningful political freedom and opportunities has been evident for some time, and recent political "reforms" have done little to alleviate this frustration.


Nasir is thus faced with the problem of answering the calls of the malcontents without surrendering his bureaucracy's tight rein on the country. Concern over these domestic ills reinforces the government's hesitation to take any bold initiatives or make risky concessions in the field of foreign policy for some time to come, especially where Israel is concerned.

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Congo (Kinshasa): The army is again engaging rebel bands in two separate areas of the country.

Since mid-October, two rebel groups, remnants of the 1964-65 Simba rebellion, have renewed activity, partly in reaction to the government's execution of rebel leader Pierre Mulele. Rebels in Kwilu, Mulele's home area, were sparked into resistance by army mop-up operations. In Kivu Province, where the rebels' influence is strong and where they have been sporadically active for several years, new outbreaks and rumors of impending attacks have worried the harassed army.

The rebels are more bandits than revolutionaries, and are unlikely to launch a major new rebellion by themselves. They lack cohesion and, at present, are not getting outside support. Nevertheless, they are nearly impossible to wipe out and will remain a problem for the central government for some time to come.

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Burma: General Ne Win appears to be considering broader civilian participation in the military government.

In what could be the first step in this direction, Ne Win has called a meeting with ex-politicians for 29 November. He may hope that from meetings with civilian leaders he can devise a formula for their participation in the government while the military retain effective control.

Ne Win ambiguously raised the possibility of civilian participation in three speeches in September. His silence on the subject since then may have reflected uncertainty over how to proceed.

The release last week of virtually all remaining non-Communist political prisoners increased speculation in Rangoon over prospects of the military sharing their power with civilians. Ne Win is said to desire to bolster the government's faltering Burma Socialist Program Party by shifting some military men from government jobs to full-time work on party organization. Expectations are high among ex-politicians that this would create vacancies for them. Ne Win may believe that in perfecting party organization, he will enhance the military's capability for managing the ultimate inclusion of civilians in the government.

Although the military may progress beyond the mere token current representation of civilians in the government, Ne Win almost certainly does not intend to relinquish essential power in the foreseeable future.

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Malaysia: The Communists of West Malaysia appear to have abandoned their policy of parliamentary action in favor of increased militancy, but no outbreak of violence seems imminent.

An official Malaysian "white paper," issued in conjunction with the recent round-up of some 140 Communist suspects, concludes that Communist strategy in West Malaysia has shifted in recent months from a combination of parliamentary methods and open mass struggle to militancy based on armed force and illegal mass action. The paper points out that the parliamentary "struggle" has been carried out primarily through the opposition Labor Party and Peoples Party. The paper further asserts that the Communist threat is enhanced by "extremist groups"--obviously referring to right-wing Malay elements--which exploit differences between the Malay and Chinese communities.

Although these conclusions about a shift in Communist strategy seem to be generally substantiated, the Communists, particularly after the recent arrests, are in no position to begin either urban violence or guerrilla warfare. Elections scheduled for early 1969 would give the Communists an opportunity to test their new strategy if they were able to build up their forces by then. The central committee of the Labor Party recently voted to boycott these elections, suggesting that party members may attempt instead to disrupt the elections by militant tactics.

On balance, however, it would appear that such efforts would be unsuccessful. The government's security and intelligence forces are highly effective, and the economy, at least for the short run, promises to remain stable. Moreover, the popular Rahman government should have no difficulty in retaining power in the elections.

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## NOTES

Peru: A split is developing within the military government over what policy to follow on nationalization of foreign business properties. Moderates within the cabinet continue to oppose further government action against US companies, but radical nationalist officers advising President Velasco are urging him to nationalize the remaining assets of the International Petroleum Company and to increase the government's share of the profits from the Southern Peru Copper Company. Velasco is due to retire from the army in January, and an effort may be made then to replace	ı
him as president.	

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